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Still Rising or Risen (or both)? Why and How China Matters  
 
 
Shaun Breslin 
University of Warwick 
 
 
Abstract 
 
When external eyes turned to China thirty years ago (if they did at all), the focus 
was still on the extent to which it might be breaking away from its socialist 
economic past. And though we didn’t know it at the time, intra-elite debates over 
how far (and to where) reforms should go would eventually play some part in 
shaping what happened in Tiananmen Square in 1989; events that would place 
China on the verge of international isolation. This paper traces the evolution 
from isolation to a position where some in China now think it is now second only 
to the US in the ranking of world powers. It will focus on how scholarship on 
China in the journal has changed over the years, but also on some of the 
constants and recurring questions and issues that have inspired research over 
the years. In addition, notwithstanding a very real and very large shift in China’s 
global power capabilities, it will suggest that asking if China matters, or more 
correctly, how China matters in different issue areas, remains a very useful 
intellectual exercise today.  
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While all the topics covered in this special issue will reveal thirty years of immense 
change, it is hard to think of a country that has undergone greater change over these 
years than China. When the first issue of The Pacific Review (TPR) was published, 
China was still only at the end of its first decade of economic reform; in terms of 
reform in urban industrial sectors, less than half a decade had passed. China was still 
in the process of breaking free from its Maoist past, and was not a particularly 
important actor on the global scene (or even the regional scene for that matter) either 
politically or economically. And things were about to take a turn for the worse in a 
number of ways as political turmoil in 1989 revealed the extent of both intra-elite 
conflict and also popular discontent, and threatened to leave China in a state of 
international isolation. 
 
Of course, that threat of isolation did not come to pass. Scroll forward ten years and 
China had not only survived the Asian Financial Crisis pretty much intact, but had 
become a major player in the regional and global economy. Add another ten years and 
China was on the verge of emerging from another economic crisis – this time not a 
regional one – with an enhanced position in the global order, questioning the wisdom 
of trying to maintain a low profile in international politics. Another decade on, and 
China is almost universally thought of as a Great Power by others; and although most 
Chinese officials and researchers would deny it, the idea that China has risen to the 
rank of global No.2 behind the USA has at least some proponents even if it is not a 
universally held consensus.  
 
This paper traces the way in which these changes have been followed, and in some 
cases predicted, in the pages of this journal. Whilst looking for change, it also looks 
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for continuity, and identifies some of the key research themes, questions and 
approaches that have persisted over the years. It does so by viewing snapshots of 
China related scholarship around four major anniversary events; on and after the 
journal’s first birthday, in the volumes around both the tenth and twentieth 
anniversaries, and finally the state of scholarship today. One of these constants is 
uncertainty over where exactly the Chinese economy is going, often combined with 
unanswered questions about the relationship between economic and socio-political 
change. Questioning the direction of travel for the economy feeds into another 
constant, in the search for potential sources of Chinese (regional or global) power. An 
underpinning question here is whether China, either alone or with allies, might 
undermine the US dominated liberal order, and how others should respond/have 
responded to this putative China challenge. Not surprisingly, there is no single 
collective conclusion from thirty years of scholarship from varied theoretical 
perspectives. But the resulting collective diversity is in many ways positive, as it 
allows us to disaggregate the study of China’s (potential) global role and to ask how 
does China matter in different ways across different issue areas, and to different 
people and states? 
 
Volume One, 1988: New Dawn Fades 
Four things stand out from a re-reading of the early volumes of TPR. The first is a 
reminder that it was a rather different type of journal in its early volumes. Quite apart 
from its physical manifestation (A4 format with a solid blue cover) it had a specific 
intention of trying to bridge the academic-policy divide. To this end, it took shorter 
papers, including those that focussed on issues in the news. Research in the journal 
has always reflected real world changes – indeed, explaining the changing nature of 
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China as a global actor from relative isolation to global power is one of overall long-
term trends that we have covered over the years. However, the nature of the original 
incarnation of the journal meant that it could respond rather quickly to important 
events. And the events that accompanied the early years of the journal from the 13th 
Party Congress to the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 certainly provided plenty 
of change to be reflected on. 
 
The second is that it was Japan and not China that was very much seen as the major 
power in the region, and also a potential challenger to the US as the world’s 
predominant power. While this is not surprising given the relative positions of China 
and Japan at the time, it is interesting to look at the reasons that Japan was considered 
the contender power. Emmott (1989: 173) for example pointed to the growth of 
Japanese capital surpluses, its position as “America’s chief creditor” and the world’s 
“most important supplier of liquidity” and the increasing global role of large Japanese 
banks as reasons why Japan was thought of as “buying up the world”. Of course, this 
does not mean that the China (economic) challenge will similarly ebb away, but it is 
salient to be reminded that not all trajectories continue forever, and that inevitable 
futures sometimes evolve into something quite different.  
 
Third, the Cold War still dominated much thinking on the region, which was seen as a 
key potential site of contestation between the superpowers. As a result, the focus on 
China as a regional security actor (when there was one) was secondary to broader 
concern about the Soviet Union. Despite the growth of Chinese arms exports (Shichor 
1988), a lack of military modernization meant that China was not really considered to 
be a significant military power in its own right (O’Neill 1987). More important 
 5 
was its role (and potential future role) as a willing pawn in a game of 
superpower rivalry in the region. Although Beijing saw the Soviet Union as the 
only real threat to Chinese security at the time (Glaser 1988), there was some 
concern that a move towards Sino-Soviet détente in 1986-7 might lead to a shift 
in the geometries of power in the region resulting in a decline in US power (Mori 
1988: 290).  
 
Fourth, when the focus was specifically on China itself, the main concern was on 
evolving domestic transitions rather than on even broadly defined international 
interactions. Again, this is not particularly surprising given China’s rather 
secondary role in the global security architecture, and the still relatively 
inwardly focussed nature of the Chinese economy. Indeed, China either hadn’t 
established or had suspended diplomatic relations with a number of regional 
states (Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore and South Korea) in 1987, and was two 
years away from facing international embargoes after the events of Tiananmen 
Square. Notably, when Adshead (1989) published “China joins the world order?”, 
this was still very much an exercise in speculation, rather than a declaration that 
China had already arrived.  
 
There were, of course, exceptions to the principally domestic focus. For example, 
whilst still emphasising the predominantly inward looking orientation of the Chinese 
economy, Chiba (1989) provided one of the first considerations of China’s potential 
role in regional economic cooperation mechanisms. He might have got the details of 
how China might impact on the regional economy a bit wrong, but even to focus on 
China and regional cooperation in this way at this time was rather prescient. Even 
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more prescient was Valencia’s (1988) paper on the very real potential for conflict 
over competing territorial claims in the South China Seas. All that seems to have 
changed is France’s “lingering claim” no longer seems to linger and the Soviet Navy 
is no longer around to be an actor. But you could more or less give this article to 
somebody who wanted to know what all the fuss was about in the South China Sea 
today.1  
 
The early emphasis on domestic change is indicated by the two pieces in the first 
issue; one a comparison between Chinese reform and what was happening in the 
Soviet Union (Kaser 1988), and the other an analysis of the 13th Party Congress that 
had taken place the year before (Goodman 1988). Collectively, these papers deal with 
two issues that to various degrees and in different ways still inform much scholarship 
on China today. The first, as highlighted by the Goodman piece, is the relationship 
between economic reform and political change. Despite the emergence of “a new 
modernising elite, and the final passing of the revolutionary generation” in 1987 
(Goodman 1988: 101), the political reform that many hoped for (and many 
thought was essential for the CCP to stay in power) did not seem to be 
forthcoming. On the contrary, with the forced resignation of the pro-reform Hu 
Yaobang from his position of party leader in 1987 amidst student protests calling 
for greater political liberalisation, the immediate direction of travel seemed to be 
away, rather than towards, greater political freedoms.  
 
Disorder? 
The overarching concern here was, and still is, the extent to which illiberal 
authoritarian one party rule and a relative lack of political freedom is compatible 
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with an increasingly (though not totally) liberal economic system. In particular, 
given the abandonment in the early 1980s of the party’s previous emphasis on 
ideological (and charismatic) sources of legitimacy, how could and should the 
party go about building new ways of convincing the people of its right to rule? 
And on a more pragmatic level, did/does the party have the capacity and skill to 
deal with the dislocations and dissatisfactions that emerged as one model of 
political economy was (often painfully) replaced by a new one? Chan’s (1989: 
131) analysis from a special issue on China in 1989 was rather prophetic given 
what happened later in the year. It could have been made in any one of the 
subsequent years: 
China's social and moral fabric is under challenge from the enormous 
economic changes that are being put in place …. Those who see 
themselves as the losers are worried and growing impatient. Ordinary 
people increasingly perceive the officialdom as morally bankrupt, and 
believe that the large portion of the new monied elite that has ties to 
bureaucracy is attaining its wealth through illegitimate means 
China in the mid-1980s was a country that appeared to be at the dawn of a new bright 
post-Maoist future. By the end of the decade, that glow had faded considerably.  
 
Lest this interest on the potential for disorder sounds like a western liberal 
concern, we should note that it has been the focus of considerable interest and 
research from within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. If anything, the 
party has been more negative in its assessment of its own ruling capacity than 
most external (Western) observers have been (Zeng 2016); though of course, 
some external observers are convinced that something must break, and  
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disparities between the political/social and economic systems cannot hold in the 
long run (Chang 2012).  
 
A means to an end  
If political reform (and the lack of it) provide one of the constants over the last 
three decades, the ongoing process of economic reform and where it might end 
provides a second. Both the Goodman (1988) and Kaser (1988) papers 
considered the ways in which the Chinese leadership were searching for an 
economic structure that, while increasingly utilising market forces and 
facilitating the growth of the private sector, remained something short of a fully 
functioning western style free market economy. Clearly the extent of the non-
state sector and of market forces is much greater than it was in 1987. Indeed, it is 
difficult to be in China today and remember what it was like to be in China in the 
mid to late 1980s. At times it seems like a different country rather than just a 
different epoch.  
 
But there are threads that link analyses of the Chinese economy in 1987 to 
whatever it is that the Chinese economy is evolving into today. The fact that the 
CCP is still in charge to try and oversee this evolution is notable in itself given 
what happened in other communist party states. Furthermore, maintaining 
communist party authority and ensuring that the state has the ability to control 
the market are as much a source of economic reform agendas today as they were 
in 1988; and arguably as much a source of uncertainty about the future as well. 
Facilitating economic growth might be an end in itself, but it has also been a 
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means to different ends as well; a key tool in the party’s attempts to establish 
new sources of legitimacy in a post-revolutionary age.  
 
Volume ten, 1997: Interzone  
In the following years, scholarship in the TPR entered a sort of intermediate zone 
between the study of the domestic politics of reform alongside a growing interest 
in China’s global role and impact. So a decade after Tiananmen, Lau (1999) was 
still considering the schisms between the left and right in Chinese elite politics 
that had formed the backdrop to Tiananmen (Breslin 1989), and what this might 
mean for the nature of China’s economic transition to whatever it was that it 
might be transiting to. But over these years, China’s international profile and 
activity also grew rapidly, leading to significant change in the way that China was 
being viewed and assessed.  
 
Scholarship on China’s international interactions in TPR over the years has been 
inspired by a number of different theoretical and conceptual approaches. This 
has resulted in a varied collection of focuses, types of analyses, and conclusions. 
However, one of the common threads that a review of thirty years of writing 
reveals is an almost constant watch for potential axis of power that China might 
form with others to counter or challenge US power and predominance. Relations 
with first the Soviet Union then Russia, Europe, China’s Asian neighbours and 
other developing countries have all been identified at one time or another as 
forming potentially damaging blocs for the US and the West. It is notable, though, 
that when the analysis moves beyond the identification of potential new 
alliances, and digs deeper into the nature of them, then it has proved difficult to 
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find evidence of cohesive coalitions. To be sure, there are plenty of examples of 
issue-specific cooperation, coordination, and coincidences of interests and 
objectives. But this is not the same as the creation of the sort of lasting bloc-type 
relationships that characterised the Cold War era, and some seem to be looking 
for as the US unipolar era transforms into something else. Whether this leaves 
the glass half full or half empty rather depends on your view of the nature of the 
current global order, and the benefits (or not) of challenges to it.  
 
The term “international interactions” is used deliberately above as there has also 
been a significant focus on broadly defined political economy issues like 
investment, trade, and regional production networks (connected to broader 
global processes). And as China’s regional and global economic profile and 
impact increased in and after the 1990s, so scholarship on China reflected this 
shift. And while there has been considerable theoretical pluralism, there has 
perhaps been a tendency for research in the journal to focus on the interplay 
between the internal and the international, seeking to identify domestic drivers 
of Chinese action and objectives. This has included scholarship that reports 
and/or engages with increasingly plural domestic Chinese debates and 
discourses about the nature of the global order and China’s place within it. And it 
is notable that in the tenth anniversary year, we published two articles by 
Chinese scholars at the Chinese academy of Social Sciences (Wang 1997; Zhang 
1997) that did exactly this.  
 
No love lost: The Human Rights Agenda 
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By 1997, three key changes over the previous decade shaped the way that China 
was acting internationally, and the way that other key actors were responding to 
a changing China. The first was the end of the Cold War, and the resulting 
realignment of (potential) alliances in the region. On one level, the potential for a 
new Russo-China axis identified in the early issues of the journal came under 
renewed focus (Bilveer 1998). On another more important level, the end of the 
Cold War removed the strategic space between the two superpowers that 
China’s leaders had quite skilfully operated within in the post-Mao era. This 
opened the door for the US in particular to reconsider its previously rather 
benign stance towards China based on the need to be close to Beijing to counter 
Moscow.  
 
The second was the consequences of Tiananmen. By 1997, the possibility of 
China’s international isolation that had seemed possible in 1989 had dissipated. 
The arms embargo remained (and still does today). But any thought of a 
prolonged economic isolation of China had given way to the economic logic of 
doing more with and in China that we will discuss shortly. Nevertheless, the 
combination of these first two changes meant that a space existed for a new light 
to be shed on China’s internal politics and the nature of China’s human rights regime 
(Ming Wan 1997). And although the above-mentioned economic logic increasingly 
tended to dominate other countries’ perceptions of China, dissatisfaction with the 
pace of political change and the nature of the Chinese political order cast at least 
some sort of shadow over bilateral relations with Western liberal states.  
 
Shadowplay: To engage or contain 
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But the third and most significant change was the expansion of an often ill-
defined era of globalisation. Or more correctly, it was the way in which China’s 
leaders had decided to reinvigorate the domestic reform momentum and 
develop a new form of engagement with the capitalist global economy in a way 
that dovetailed with the interests of globally mobile finance, and increasingly 
mobile and fragmented post-fordist production processes. This resulted in a 
phenomenal growth in investment into China after 1992, which helped drive an 
equally phenomenal growth in Chinese trade (Breslin 1996).  
 
In combination, these changes came together to create an uncertain role for 
China in the global order. From Chinese perspectives, as noted by Wang Jisi 
(1997) and Yu (1997) there was a general feeling that while the US was the 
predominant global power, it could no longer rely on automatic support from its 
traditional allies, and new poles of power might be emerging. There was still no 
question, though, of China looking anything like a potential global great power 
within China itself, with Japan still looking like the most likely challenger power 
to the US. For China, the main impulse was still to look inward towards economic 
development and stability rather that outward, with the main goal of China’s 
international strategy being the creation of a stable regional order to facilitate 
domestic growth. And this had to be done in a global order where the US was 
determined to remain the dominant power in East Asia.  
 
Outside China, though, China’s rise was beginning to be associated with a 
potentially less benign and peaceful global order than that envisaged (or hoped 
for) from within China. And we should not forget that there was some concern 
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that the show of military force shown by the PLA navy in the Taiwan Straits the 
previous year and China’s firm commitment to others maintaining a one China 
policy might lead to something more serious. It was widely considered unlikely 
that China would provide a similar threat to the US as that posed by the Soviet 
Union in the Cold War. Nevertheless, a less then peaceful pacific was a distinct 
possibility “because of China's history of aggression, the nature of its regime, and 
the apparent fragility of security in Asia” (Byman, Cliff and Saunders 1999: 422).  
 
As we will see, there was still considerable disagreement on how far China had 
already risen, and how far it might go. But the dominant position had shifted 
from asking if China would rise, to more or less accepting that after the 
interregnum of Tiananmen, its further rise was inevitable. Now the major 
question was how could/should this rise be “managed” to ensure that it didn't 
disrupt the existing global order? (Johnston and Ross 1999). As Maull (1997: 
466) put it, as China would at some point become too big and powerful to be 
managed, then it was imperative to think and act now (or then) and that 
“reconciling China with international order probably represents the biggest 
political challenge the world is facing today.” 
 
A snapshot of the debates in and after our tenth anniversary reveals a tension 
between the desire to promote human rights and condition China’s rise on the 
one hand, and a realisation that others might be able to benefit economically 
from China’s ongoing rise on the other. Perhaps more clearly, it shows that this 
tension was becoming less tense, and that the logic of economic opportunities 
was already tending to win out. For example, while “the dominant issue in 1990-
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94 was the linkage between China's human rights record and its MFN status with 
the United States” (Ming 1997, 242), this had now given way to what Ming Wan 
called a “strategic understanding” with a China that was “now widely perceived 
to be the only country capable of posing a serious challenge to the United States 
in the future” (Ming 1997: 248).  
 
Similarly, Maull (1997: 470) identified what he called a European shift towards a 
resolutely commercial approach”, led by Germany but also pursued by the UK 
and France. Moreover, this attempt to privilege commercial and business 
interests was leading to competition between western states to be friendly 
towards China in order to gain market access and contracts, leading to a 
fragmentation of any attempt to manage China’s rise.  
 
It is notable that this identification of an emphasis on commercial relations in 
1997 came just two years after a vote tabled to criticise China’s human rights 
record was defeated by just one vote in the UN Human Rights Commission. Of 
course, the argument can be made that engaging China and encouraging it to 
become part of the existing global liberal economic order was the best way of 
generating domestic political change in China as well. This was a powerful 
argument in the engagement versus containment debate (Byman, Cliff and 
Saunders 1999) that continued to look large in debates over China policy into the 
new millennium. In general, though, the collective contributions in our journal 
point more towards the dominance of economic pragmatism than they do an 
endorsement of Manchester school liberalism.  
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Autosuggestion: Did China Matter? 
The engagement-containment debate was in large part driven by the politics of 
prediction and considerations of what China could or would become in the 
future. This resulted in a number of publications that in their titles at least upped 
the ante by predicting ever more dramatic futures. Arguably the most influential 
of these was the prediction by Bernstein and Munro (1997) of “The Coming 
Conflict with China”. 
 
This type of posturing and positioning irked Gerry Segal, who by then had passed 
the editorship of TPR on to Richard Higgott. Annoyingly for us, his most 
memorable intervention in the debates over China’s rise was published 
elsewhere. But as we wouldn't have been here without him, and his editorship of 
TPR paved the way for others to take the study of China forward, it seems 
appropriate to take a side step away from the pages of this journal and to briefly 
consider his take on China a decade on from the journal’s launch.2 
 
It is perhaps sometimes forgotten that the widely remembered title “Does China 
Matter” had a question mark after it, and was not an outright statement that 
China didn't matter at all. For Segal (1998, 1999), China really did matter in 
different ways in different areas to different people. Nonetheless, the reality was 
that China was not as important as it was being made out to be by most political 
commentators and some academic scholars. Its significance was being 
considerably exaggerated by both those who wanted to engage China, and those 
who sought ways to contain and control its rise; and the ante was often being 
upped in response to the latest pronouncement/evaluation by the opposing 
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camp. This unrealistic understanding of China’s capabilities, he argued, was not 
just a matter of academic (mis)adventure, but was also leading to bad policy 
making.  
 
It is not my intention to go into detail here about the extent of this exaggeration 
or what Segal thought a more realistic appreciation of China should look like – a 
re-read (or first time read) of the original is still a rewarding exercise. That it 
forces the reader to think about what they are taking for granted is an important 
lesson that we will return to later. And another key lesion is that one of the key 
sources of China’s growing power might be the assumption by others that it 
already has that power. Or more often, others treated China not as it was at the 
time, but because of the global power they expected it to (inevitably) become in 
the future. China’s “imagined power” of the future, became a source of its real 
and tangible power much earlier (Breslin 2011).  
 
Volume Twenty, 2007: A Change of Speed, a Change of Style  
It takes time for real life events to become reflected in academic scholarship that 
tries to analyse and explain them (and be refereed and published). So the 
unfolding Asian Financial Crisis was not reflected in publications in 1997-8. A 
decade on, though, the crisis and its consequences had helped shape both the 
external environment in which China’s rise continued, and domestic debates in 
China about the security and sustainability of this rise. Those who focussed on 
domestic change in China were still questioning China’s leaders ability to manage 
reform – and in particular to control the social consequences of reform for the 
most vulnerable. This included identifying an at best rather mixed record of 
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dealing with unemployment - and in particular, the more long term 
consequences of not having a job in terms of access to health, education and 
welfare services (Duckett and Hussain 2008). The same was true of analyses of the 
provision of basic services in rural areas, which also highlighted the extent of regional 
inequalities (including within provinces rather than just between them) and the still 
ongoing tension between the central and local governments when it came to funding 
and spending decisions and responsibilities (Yep 2008; Li 2008).  
 
For those more concerned with China’s external economic relations and impact, the 
consensus was that China had had a good crisis, earning considerable approval for 
acting “responsibly” in not devaluing the Renminbi to restore the competiveness of 
Chinese exports relative to those from the crisis hit states of the region. The relatively 
closed nature of the Chinese financial system had also proved the wisdom of not 
moving to a more liberal system too quickly. But at the same time the crisis had 
provided an example of the vulnerabilities that emerged from becoming integrated 
into regional and global economic structures, particularly when exports were an 
important source of growth, and through this, an important part of performance based 
legitimacy for the CCP.  
 
From Safety to Where?  
The emergence and evolution of the discourse on economic (in)security within 
China, as traced in the journal by Benjamin Yeung (2008), helped change Chinese 
thinking; both on the nature of security challenges and the best way of dealing with 
these new challenges. Alongside other crises like bird flu and SARs, and also 
influenced by the September 11th terrorist attacks, a consensus emerged that China 
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needed a “new security concept” (xin anquan guan) (Narramore 2008). With 
economic flows, infectious diseases and terrorist activity not fitting easily into a world 
of independent sovereign states ensuring their own security, this new approach meant 
focussing on building partnerships with others to solve collective transnational 
problems. Most notably of all, this meant that a country that was once very suspicious 
of regional organisations and institutions that were widely viewed as antithetical to 
Chinese interests now became not just an active partner in them, but also an 
enthusiastic promoter of new regional forms (Ming Wan 2007).  
 
Conceptions of economic insecurity fed into, and were also informed by, China’s 
pursuit of WTO membership. Despite considerable concerns in China about the 
impact of opening up the domestic economy to foreign competition, in the years after 
WTO entry was attained in 2001, the main focus of attention was outwards, rather 
than inwards. One key outward consequence was a phenomenal build up of foreign 
exchange reserves, and a build up of dollar holdings and US debt. And of course 
these trends were on the verge of taking on an even greater significance when 
attention turned to the cause and significance of global imbalances in and for the 
impending global financial crisis. When combined with a relatively new focus on 
China’s economic interactions with other developing countries,3 then there was a 
growing acceptance that China had joined Japan, the European Union and the 
USA as “great powers in the contemporary world” (Ming Wang, 2007: 408).  
 
Within China itself, there remained a strong feeling that the existing powers 
were trying to maintain their predominance in the global order, and prevent 
China’s rise. This feeling of being victimised built on strong pre-existing 
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resentment to the way that the west, and more important Japan, had treated 
China in the past (and the perceived lack of an apology for this treatment from 
Japan) to generate a new wave of nationalist sentiment across China. Or more 
correctly as contributions to the journal showed, a variety of different types of 
broadly nationalist beliefs held and articulated by different sets of Chinese actors 
(Suzuki 2007; Shen and Cheung 2007).  
 
Amongst China’s leaders at the time, there was concern that an increasingly 
powerful China might result in a revival of the “China threat thesis” overseas. 
The idea here was that those hostile to China’s rise would try to portray it as a 
danger to the status quo and destabilising for the international order. As such it 
was important to maintain a low profile, which became widely known as the 
“taoguang yanghui” strategy (Shen and Cheung 2007). The key here was to 
reassure the world – and primarily China’s neighbours – that China had no 
hegemonic intentions at all, and that they had nothing to fear from a rising China 
that was committed to peace and cooperation (Narramore 2008). Moreover, a 
responsible and increasingly wealthy rising or risen China was a good thing for 
the region.  
 
This perception of China’s global role on the eve of the global crisis in 2008 
marked a considerable and substantial shift from the position on the eve of the 
Asian Financial Crisis just over a decade earlier. Whilst those who studied 
domestic politics still saw potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses, the 
predominant focus was very much on how China would behave as a great power 
– or indeed, was already acting as one. But in hindsight, we can suggest with 
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some confidence that an even bigger change in China’s international status was 
just round the corner.  
 
These Days: Leaders of Men? 
In the third issue of volume 29 in 2016, we published a special section consisting 
of four Chinese scholars’ perceptions of the current state of global governance 
reform. This in itself might not have surprised somebody trying to predict future 
trends in 2007-8, as the possibility of China trying to change the western 
dominated global order was already being debated at the time (Ikenberry 2008). 
But the choice of the specific case studies of governance forms really would have 
surprised, as none of them even existed in 2007; at least in their current forms. 
While the G20 (Zhu 2016) can be traced back to its first incarnation as a forum 
for finance ministers to 1999, its current embodiment including heads of states’ 
summits was very much a product of the global financial crisis. And though the 
idea of a group of dissatisfied rising powers and the term BRIC had been 
established as early as 2001, but the first summit did not take place until 2009, 
and the BRICS (now including South Africa) New Development Bank was not 
proposed until 2012 (Liu 2016). But even if these two had some pre-2008 
antecedents, the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Ren 
2016) and the promotion of the One Belt One Road initiative (Wang 2016) are 
very much new issues and agendas. And collectively, they point to a very 
different Chinese position than before the global crisis, and Xi Jinping’s 
assumption of power in 2012.  
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Trying to identify clean beginning and end dates for historical epochs is always 
fraught with difficulty. And it is always possible that things may change around 
again and head in different directions. But with all this in mind, the global 
financial crisis does seem to mark a key turning point – not least in China itself 
where conceptions of China’s place in a hierarchy of global powers has shifted. 
Although a number of Chinese international relations specialists remain a little 
sceptical about how much power China really has, there is a clear consensus that 
the time has come to be more assertive and proactive in defending China’s core 
interests and trying to find ways of facilitating China’s interests and objectives at 
the global level.  
 
Xi Jinping’s assertion that China and the US need to find a new type of 
relationship (xinxing daguo guanxi) that does not repeat the confrontational 
mistakes of previous Great Power competition makes it very clear that he at least 
considers China to be a Great Power. To be sure, the United States might be an 
even Greater Power that China is, and is likely to remain so for some time to 
come. But in much of what is said in China about China’s global position, China 
seems to be perceived as not just one of a group of emerging Great Powers, but 
as standing out from that group of emerging dissatisfied powers as “second 
among equals in the Great Power club” (Zhang 2016: 797). Perhaps it is time to 
stop talking of China as rising, and accepting that while its journey is far from 
over, in many respects it is already risen.  
 
However, amongst change, there is some continuity. In part, the last decade of 
TPR’s life has simply seen the intensification of long standing concerns and 
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research focuses and heightened their significance. For example, the search is 
still on for potential alliances and blocs that might challenge the Western liberal 
order. Russia is still seen as the most likely candidate, due to shared common 
resistance to both liberal political norms and also liberal economic forms of 
global governance. To be sure, the two do not share common positions on all 
issues, and the relationship is a long long way from some type of Cold War style 
alliance (Liu 2016). But there is evidence that this shared dissatisfaction has led 
to joint action that has implications for the functioning of the liberal global order 
(if not the construction of a coherent alternative to it) (Wishnick, 
2016/forthcoming).  
 
The search for solutions to China’s many maritime disputes with its regional 
neighbours also continues, shaped by the overarching reality that China is 
simultaneously a key engine of regional economic growth, and also one of the 
major sources of insecurity. And China’s significance in both economic and 
security terms has increased in recent years (Nakano 2016). For countries like 
Australia, which have benefitted from the expansion of Chinese overseas 
investment (particularly in this case in the search for raw materials) this has 
added a new dimension to the existing challenge of balancing the economic 
opportunities from a rising China with political/security concerns; the danger of 
economic dependence (Bloomfield 2016).  
 
However, it is not just that countries inside and outside the region are continuing 
to debate how best to handle their bilateral relationship with China. The nature 
of China’s rise is also “changing the scope of action for other international actors” 
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(Maier-Knapp 2016: 411) and thus influencing relationships between other 
actors where China is not directly involved; in Maier-Knapp’s example, between 
the EU and ASEAN. This seems to represent something more than just an 
escalation of previous trends. And if this is one of the answers to the question, 
“what’s new?”, we might also add the growing significance of India as a regional 
actor; not least in partnership with those seeking ways of mitigating Chinese 
regional power like Australia (Chako and Davis 2015). Indeed, if the region we 
are studying was identified as a potential site of contestation between the Soviet 
Union and the USA in 1987, then what the region itself actually is, might be or 
should be seems to be increasingly being defined by contestation between China 
and a number of “others” today.  
 
Conclusion: Three Decades of Insight 
In a very short period in the late summer of 2015, the rather dominant common 
sense assumption that China was on an inexorable rise to global dominance took 
a bit of a hit. With growth slowing in China, the Shanghai stock market plunging, 
and the government spending millions trying to maintain currency stability, a 
new sense of caution set it. Not just caution about China’s future, but also about 
what this might mean for a global economy still trying to rebound from the 
consequences of the global financial crisis. This response shows the extent to 
which China has rapidly come to be seen as central to the functioning of the 
global economy; it is instructive to note that no such concern spread through 
global markets and major governments (and much less attention was paid) when 
China previously suffered a stock market crash in 2007.  
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If looking back over the last thirty days of TPR teaches us one thing, it is the folly 
of making firm and confident predictions about future power transitions. If we 
keep this lesson in mind, add the memory of the economic problems of 2015 and 
also the assertion that the link between the domestic and the international needs 
strengthening, then what does 30 years of scholarship suggest about the future? 
 
In terms of economic futures, three constants run through the entire reform era 
which continue to influence the directions that China might take from here. 
These three constants are built around three contradictions – or three competing 
tensions that if not handled correctly might become antagonistic contradictions 
that could lead to disorder. Referring back to the Kaser (1988) paper from issue 
one, the first of these is the desire to unleash the economic benefits to be gained 
from liberalisation on the one hand, and the above mentioned desire to retain 
the ability to control and manage the economy on the other (in ways that go 
beyond the “normal” tools of macroeconomic management utilised in more 
market based systems). A great example comes in the Commercial Bank Law. 
This law, promulgated in 1995 but still in force today, mandates the banks to 
consider commercial criteria before extending loans. But at the same time, 
Article 34 specifically mandates the banks to “conduct their business of lending 
in accordance with the needs of the national economic and social development 
and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the State” 
(Szamosszegi and Kyle 2011: 51). This one sentence on its own says a lot about 
the nature of the Chinese market economy. The same tensions between market 
efficiency versus control can also be observed in some of the impulse behind 
State Owned Enterprise reform (and their residual role in the Chinese economy).  
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We might also use centre-local relations as another example. But whilst very 
much related, the conflicts that Blecher (1989) identified in volume two between 
the desire to unleash local initiative and innovation on one hand, and the desire 
to control (the national economy as a whole) on the other, has specific nuances. 
It is thus considered to be a separate second tension here. It is also one that 
continues to be at the heart of the reform agenda today, as the central 
government seeks to find ways of reforming a fiscal system put in place in 1994 
that is widely perceived to be struggling to be fit for purpose (Bloomberg 2016).  
 
The third tension takes us back to the question of political reform and revolves 
around the desire to unleash the economic efficiency gains from liberalisation on 
one hand, and fear of the political consequences of the social dislocations that 
this might generate on the other. The point needs making again that the specifics 
are very very different today than they were in 1988. But as the consequences of 
the transition to a different (slower) model of growth and the “new normal” are 
studied and debated, once more we see how the logic of reform impulses and 
instincts can lead in a different directions to initiatives that are instead built on 
political logics and concerned with managing and dissipating potential 
disaffection.  
 
At a later date 
This paper is not, of course, the first to try and think about “The Future of China” 
in this journal; Tony Saich’s (1989) early contribution to the journal was called 
exactly that. In it, Saich argued that perceptions of China’s future had become 
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entwined with hopes for this future, and this had resulted in overly-optimistic 
(and ultimately unfulfilled) expectations: 
 “Part of the reason for failing to predict the course of events lies with the 
wishful thinking by foreigners. Many outsiders wanted reforms in China 
to succeed and thus there was a collective blindness to facts that 
suggested the fundamentals of the system were not changing much. 
Dissenting voices found it very difficult to penetrate the fog of mild 
Chinaeuphoria.” (Saich 1989, 351) 
 
In a similar vein, trying to penetrate fog was what Segal later tried to do in “Does 
China Matter”. Not always a euphoric fog given that Chinese power was being 
asserted by those who feared it as much as wanted it. But a fog created by a 
widely held and asserted common-sense acceptance of Chinese power that 
seemed difficult to contradict. And I want to finish by returning to this idea and 
arguing that “Does China Matter?” – including its question mark - is still important 
today and has a lot to say that could influence good future scholarship on China. This 
might sound odd in an era when it is difficult to come across clearly articulated and 
convincing arguments that establish why China is globally irrelevant and does not 
matter. But the spirit of the original still has importance and salience, even if its 
overarching conclusion seems difficult to defend today.  
 
On one level it pushes us to not just treat China as a single potential power across the 
board, but to take a more nuanced disaggregated view. This entails both thinking in 
terms of the potential arena in which China can exercise its power (for example, 
neighbourhood, wider regional or global) and also identifying different degrees of 
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(potential) power in different policy/issue areas (for example, military and economic). 
On another level, it suggests that to do so, we should not just assess China’s 
capabilities by comparing China now to China in the past and seeing how much 
bigger and better it is today. Rather, we should look at China in comparison with the 
power capabilities of other (existing and rising) global powers. The former tells us a 
lot about China. The latter tells us more about China’s (potential) place in the world.  
 
Add these two levels together, and the spirit of “does China matter” tells us not to just 
accept the “common sense” assumption of the reality of China’s power, but to step 
back, ask questions, and look for evidence. It is easier to find evidence today that 
China really does matter across a range of issue areas than it did in 1997 (and 
certainly more than in 1987). And evidence can be found in the writings on China 
in this journal. This includes highlighting cases where Chinese power capabilities 
have been utilised to bring about change in others that they might otherwise not 
have made. Evidence that shows the relationship between power and influence. 
Conversely, recent research has shown that in some areas, it is harder to find 
evidence that Chinese influence has actually resulted in the real concrete change 
in others that a common sense view might simply assume (Goh 2016). But 
whatever the case, evidence should be sought out and presented rather than just 
assumed; dissenting voices should be heard and discussed; and good policy 
making should be based on considerations of a range of possible futures, rather 
than just on acceptance of a single, linear and inevitable Chinese (and therefore 
global) future.   
 
 
 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Adshead, S. (1989) ‘Mao to modernity: China joins the world order?’, The Pacific 
Review, 2(3): 236-245 
 
Bilveer , S. (1998) ‘East Asia in Russia's foreign policy: A new Russo‐Chinese 
axis?’, The Pacific Review, 11(4): 485-503. 
 
Blecher, M. (1989) ‘State administration and economic reform: Old dog snubs 
master, but learns new tricks’, The Pacific Review, 2(2): 94-106. 
 
Bloomberg (2016) ‘China’s Cash-Strapped Local Governments Look to Boost 
Funds’, Bloomberg, 23 May, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-23/china-s-cash-strapped-
local-governments-mull-ways-to-boost-funds accessed 24 May 2016 
 
Bernstein, R. and Munro, R. (1997) The Coming conflict With China. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Bloomfield, A. (2016) ‘To balance or to bandwagon? Adjusting to China's rise 
during Australia's Rudd–Gillard era’, The Pacific Review, 29(2): 259-282. 
 
Breslin, S. (1989) ‘China in crisis’, The Pacific Review, 2(3): 252-255. 
 
Breslin, S. (1996) ‘China in East Asia: The process and implications of 
regionalization’, The Pacific Review, 9(4): 463-487. 
 
Breslin, S. (2011) ‘The Soft Notion of China’s Soft Power’, a Chatham House 
Programme paper, 2011, available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/1001/ 
 
Byman, D., Cliff, R. and Saunders, P. (1999) ‘US policy options toward an 
emerging China’, The Pacific Review, 12(3): 421-451. 
 
Chan, A. (1989) ‘The challenge to the social fabric’, The Pacific Review, 2(2): 121-
131. 
 
Chacko, P. and Davis, A. (2015) ‘The natural/neglected relationship: liberalism, 
identity and India–Australia relations’, The Pacific Review, DOI: 
10.1080/09512748.2015.1100665 
 
 29 
Chang, G. (2011) ‘The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition’, Foreign Policy, 
29th December, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/29/the-coming-
collapse-of-china-2012-edition/ accessed 4th January 2012.  
 
Chiba, A. (1989) ‘Pacific co‐operation and China’, The Pacific Review, 2(1): 44-56. 
 
Cornelissen, S. and Taylor, I. (2000) ‘The political economy of China and Japan's 
relationship with Africa: a comparative perspective’, The Pacific Review, 13(4): 
615-633. 
 
Duckett, J. and Hussain, A. (2008) ‘Tackling unemployment in 
China: state capacity and governance issues’, The Pacific Review, 21(2): 211-229. 
 
Emmott, W. (1989) ‘The limits to Japanese power’, The Pacific Review, 2(3): 173-
180. 
 
Glaser, B. (1988) ‘Arms control in northeast Asia’, The Pacific Review, 1(2): 164-
180. 
 
Goh, E. (ed) (2016) Rising China's Influence in Developing Asia. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Goodman, D. (1988) ‘The 13th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party’, The 
Pacific Review, 1(1): 97-101. 
 
Ikenberry, J.. (2008) ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the 
Liberal System Survive?’, Foreign Affairs, 87(1): 23–3. 
 
Johnston, A. and Ross, R. (ed) (1999) Engaging China: the Management of an 
Emerging Power. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Kaser, M. (1988) ‘Reform in the USSR and China’, The Pacific Review, 1(1): 38-49. 
 
Lau, R. (1999) ‘Left and right in China's economic reform in the 1990s and the 
façade of the “third thought liberation”’, The Pacific Review, 12(1): 79-102. 
 
Li, L. (2008) ‘State and market in public service provision: opportunities and 
traps for institutional change in rural China’, The Pacific Review, 21(3): 257-278. 
 
Liu M. (2016) ‘BRICS development: a long way to a powerful economic club and 
new international organization’, The Pacific Review, 29(3): 443-453. 
 
Maier-Knapp, N. (2016) ‘The non-traditional security concept and the EUASEAN 
relationship against the backdrop of China's rise’, The Pacific Review, 29(3): 411-
430. 
 
Maull, H. (1997) ‘Reconciling China with international order’, The Pacific Review, 
10(4): 466-479. 
 
 30 
Ming W. (1997) ‘Human rights and Sino-US relations: Policies and changing 
realities’, The Pacific Review, 10(2): 237-255. 
 
Ming W. (2007) ‘The United States, Japan, and the European Union: comparing 
political economy approaches to China’, The Pacific Review, 20(3): 397-421. 
 
Mori, K. (1988) ‘The impact of Sino‐Soviet détente’, The Pacific Review, 1(3) 290-
295. 
 
Nakano, R. (2016) ‘The Sino–Japanese territorial dispute and threat perception 
in power transition’, The Pacific Review, 29(2): 165-186. 
 
Narramore, T. (2008) ‘China and Europe: engagement, multipolarity and 
strategy’, The Pacific Review, 21(1): 87-108. 
 
O’Neill, R. (1987) ‘The balance of naval power in the Pacific’, The Pacific Review, 
1(2): 151-63. 
 
Ren X. (2016) ‘China as an institution-builder: the case of the AIIB’, The Pacific 
Review, 29(3): 435-442. 
  
Saich. A. (1989) ‘The future of China’, The Pacific Review, 2(4): 351-356. 
 
Shichor, Y. (1988) ‘Unfolded arms: Beijing's recent military sales offensive’, The 
Pacific Review, 1(3): 320-330. 
  
Suzuki, S. (2007) ‘The importance of “Othering” in China's national identity: Sino-
Japanese relations as a stage of identity conflicts’, The Pacific Review, 20(1): 23-
47. 
 
Szamosszegi, A., and Cole, K.(2011). An Analysis of State-Owned Enterprises and 
State Capitalism in China. Washington: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission 
 
Valencia, M. (1988) ‘The Spratly Islands: Dangerous ground in the South 
China Sea, The Pacific Review, 1(4): 438-443. 
 
Wang J. (1997) ‘The role of the United States as a global and pacific power: A 
view from China’, The Pacific Review, 10(1): 1-18. 
 
Wang Y. (2016) ‘Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China's 
new grand strategy’, The Pacific Review, 29(3): 455-463. 
 
Wishnick, E. (2016): ‘In search of the “Other” in Asia: Russia–China relations 
revisited’, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2016.1201129 
 
Yep, R. (2008) ‘Enhancing the redistributive capacity of the Chinese state? 
Impact of fiscal reforms on county finance’, The Pacific Review, 21(2): 231-255. 
 
 31 
Yeung, B. (2008) ‘China in the era of globalization: the emergence of the 
discourse on economic security’, The Pacific Review, 21(5): 635-660. 
 
Yu, P. (1990) ‘Protecting the Spratlys’, The Pacific Review, 3(1): 78-83. 
 
Zeng J. (2016) The Chinese Communist Party's Capacity to Rule: Ideology, 
Legitimacy and Party Cohesion. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Zhang Yongjin (2016) ‘China and liberal hierarchies in global international 
society: power and negotiation for normative change’, International Affairs, 
92(4): 795–816. 
 
Zhang Yunling. (1997) ‘Changing Sino‐US‐Japanese relations’, The Pacific Review, 
10(4): 451-465. 
 
Zhu J. (2016) ‘G20 institutional transition and global tax governance’, The Pacific 
Review, 29(3): 465-471. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 This was also the focus of an early paper by Yu (1990), which primarily focused on Taiwan’s  
response to the arrest of fisherman by the Malaysian navy in 1988.  
2 Although “Does China Matter” (Segal 1999) was published in 1999, the ideas in it were first 
aired in a special section of New Political Economy on China’s emergence the previous year 
(Segal 1998).  
3 One of the earliest assessments here was provided by Cornelissen and Taylor (2000) in a 
comparison of Chinese and Japanese engagement of Africa. 
                                                        
